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Abstract
To overcome the #P-hardness of comput-
ing/updating prices in logarithm market scoring
rule-based (LMSR-based) combinatorial predic-
tion markets, Chen et al. [5] recently used a sim-
ple Bayesian network to represent the prices of
securities in combinatorial prediction markets for
tournaments, and showed that two types of pop-
ular securities are structure preserving. In this
paper, we significantly extend this idea by em-
ploying Bayesian networks in general combina-
torial prediction markets. We reveal a very nat-
ural connection between LMSR-based combina-
torial prediction markets and probabilistic belief
aggregation,which leads to a complete character-
ization of all structure preserving securities for
decomposable network structures. Notably, the
main results by Chen et al. [5] are corollaries of
our characterization. We then prove that in order
for a very basic set of securities to be structure
preserving, the graph of the Bayesian network
must be decomposable. We also discuss some
approximation techniques for securities that are
not structure preserving.
1 Introduction
In a predictionmarket, agents trade securities about the out-
come of an uncertain event, for example, “if event E hap-
pens, this security pays off $1”. IfE does happen, the agent
receives $1 for every share of the security owned; if E does
not happen, the agent gets nothing. The price of a security
reflects a collective value for “$1 if E”, or a group-wide or
consensus probability of the eventE. The idea is to harness
market efficiency and leverage agents’ incentives to earn
money in order to price events that might not otherwise be
traded. In a predictionmarket, the primary goal is price dis-
covery and thus information aggregation, not finding gains
∗Part of this work was conducted at Yahoo! Research.
from trade. The Iowa Electronic Market and Intrade are
two examples of real-world prediction markets with a long
history of tested results [1, 2]. See Chen and Pennock [7]
for a recent survey of prediction mechanisms.
In this paper, we focus on prediction market mechanism-
s that employ a central market maker that determines the
prices of securities algorithmically based on a cost func-
tion [6]. At any time, an interested agent can query the
market maker for the price of a security and can either “take
it or leave it”: that is, decide to buy or sell some shares at
the quoted price, or do nothing. After each (infinitesimal)
trade, the market maker updates the prices of all securi-
ties. For example, suppose there is a prediction market on
a Duke basketball game, and the current price for the secu-
rity “Duke wins” is $ 0.8. If a risk-neutral agent believes
that Duke will win with 0.9 probability, then she has an
incentive to buy some shares of the security, because her
expected profit for holding one share is 0.9 − 0.8 = 0.1.
If she buys some shares of the security, then its price will
go up; on the other hand, if she sells some shares of the
security (in this case, equivalent to buying shares of Duke’s
opponent), then its price will go down. See Section 2 for
more details.
So far most work has been focusing on the prediction mar-
kets based on the cost function that corresponds to the log-
arithm market scoring rule (LMSR) [4, 5, 8, 16, 17]. Pric-
ing securities in LMSR-based prediction markets by direct-
ly using the cost function takes time that is polynomial in
the number of outcomes. Therefore, it works well if the
number of outcomes is not too large. However, in many
real-life situations the number of outcomes is exponentially
large and has a combinatorial structure. Such situations are
called combinatorial prediction markets [4, 5, 11, 16, 17].
For example, in the NCAA men’s basketball tournamen-
t, there are 64 teams and therefore 63 matches in total to
predict. Each match can be seen as a binary variable. It
follows that the prediction market for this tournament has
263 ≈ 9.2 × 1018 outcomes. Therefore, in such situation-
s, computing and updating the prices by directly using the
cost function becomes computationally intractable. In fact,
pricing LMSR-based combinatorial prediction markets is
#P-hard [4].
In LMSR-based prediction markets, at any time the prices
of the securities that correspond to disjoint, exhaustive out-
comes sum up to 1. Therefore, the market prices can be
seen as a probability distribution (which we call market
price distribution), and can be represented by a Bayesian
network. This representation might drastically reduce the
computational complexity of computing/updatingprices, e-
specially when the network structure of the Bayesian net-
work is simple. This idea was first explored by Chen et
al. [5] for a class of LMSR-based combinatorial prediction
markets for tournaments. They modeled the market price
distribution by a Bayesian network whose graph is a bal-
anced binary tree, and identified two types of popular secu-
rities with the following property: after any shares of any
such securities are sold, the updated market price distribu-
tion can still be represented by a Bayesian network with the
same structure. We call securities satisfying this property
structure-preserving securities.
However, the approach by Chen et al. has two limitations.
First, their approach only works for LMSR-based combina-
torial prediction markets for tournaments, and it is not clear
how to extend the results to general LMSR-based combi-
natorial prediction markets. Second, they only identified
two types of structure-preserving securities. It is not clear
whether other types of popular securities are also structure
preserving.
Our contribution. In this paper, we significantly extend
the idea in Chen at al. [5] to general LMSR-based combi-
natorial prediction markets. We first reveal a very natural
connection between LMSR-based combinatorial prediction
markets and probabilistic belief aggregation. More precise-
ly, let Pr denote the current market price distribution, we
show that for any security F , we can define a probability
distribution PrF such that the updated market price distri-
bution after selling some shares of F is exactly the same
as the distribution obtained by aggregating Pr and PrF by a
well-known parameterized opinion pool function called the
logarithmic opinion pool, or LogOP. In light of this connec-
tion and a previous work on aggregatingBayesian network-
s [20], we obtain a full characterization of all structure-
preserving securities for any decomposable network struc-
ture (that is, in the graph, any pair of parents of any variable
are connected). Notably, the main results in Chen et al. [5]
are corollaries of our characterization. We then show that
in order for a very basic set of securities to be structure
preserving, the network structure must be decomposable,
which justifies the motivation for us to focus on decompos-
able network structures. Finally, we briefly discuss some
ideas of approximations, when the security is not structure
preserving.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 LMSR-based Prediction Market
Let Ω = {1, . . . , N} denote the set of outcomes of a ran-
dom variable X . For any i ≤ N , a security “X = i”
means that holding each share of the security, the agen-
t will receive $1 from the market maker, if X turns out
to be i. In this paper, we use a quantity vector !q ∈ RN
to represent how many shares the market maker has sol-
d in total for each security. That is, for each i ≤ N , the
market maker has sold !q(i) shares of “X = i”. A cost
function based prediction market is characterized by a cost
function C : RN → R and an initial quantity vector !q0.
The price for " shares of “X = i” is the marginal cost
of incrementing the current quantity vector !q by "!ei in C,
where !ei is the N -dimensional vector whose ith compo-
nent is 1 and the other components are 0. That is, if the
agent wants to buy " share of “X = i”, she must pay
C(!q + "!ei) − C(!q) to the market maker. The instanta-
neous price is lim!→0(C(!q+"!ei)−C(!q))/", or equivalent-
ly ∂C(!q)/∂!q(i). Note that price is always given in units of
dollars per share, whereas cost is given in dollars.
In this paper, we focus on prediction markets with the cost
function C(!q) = b log∑Ni=1 e"q(i)/b, where the parameter b
is called the liquidity parameter for the market. This specif-
ic cost function corresponds to the logarithm market scor-
ing rule (LMSR), and we call this type of prediction mar-
kets LMSR-based prediction markets. The following equa-
tion computes the instantaneous price I"q(i) for the security
“X = i”.
I"q(i) =
∂C(!q)
∂qi
=
e"q(i)/b∑N
j=1 e
"q(j)/b
It follows that∑i≤N I"q(i) = 1. Therefore, we also call I"q
the market price distribution.
2.2 Combinatorial Prediction Markets
In combinatorial prediction markets [4], the set of out-
comes Ω has a combinatorial structure. That is, each out-
come is characterized by the values of a set of variables
V = {X1, . . . , Xn}, where for each k ≤ n, Xk takes a
value in a domain Ωk = {1, . . . , lk} with lk ≥ 2. It fol-
lows that Ω = Ω1 × · · · × Ωn. In this paper, a security is
represented by a logical formula F over V in conjunctive
normal form (CNF).1 That is, F = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ CK , where
for any i ≤ K , Ci = Li1 ∨ · · · ∨ Lisi , and Lij is either
[Xk = l] or ¬[Xk = l] (equivalently, Xk *= l) for some
variable Xk ∈ V and some value l ∈ Ωk. Cj is called a
clause and Lij is called a literal. If F is satisfied under the
eventual true outcome (which is a valuation over V), then
the market maker should pay the agent $1 for each share of
F the agent holds; otherwise the agent receives nothing for
1The representation of F does not affect our characterization
results. It only affects the computational complexity of some
problems studied later in this paper.
holding F .
By definition, in an LMSR-based combinatorial prediction
market, the instantaneous price ofF is the sum of the prices
of the securities that correspond to the valuations under
which F is satisfied. That is, I"q(F ) =
∑
"v:F ("v)=1 I"q(!v) =
(
∑
"v:F ("v)=1 e
"q("v)/b)/(
∑
"y e
"q("y)/b). Chen et al. [5] have
shown that the price for∆b shares of F is b log(e∆I"q(F )+
1 − I"q(F )). We note that computing I"q(F ) is harder than
computing marginal probabilities in I"q , which is a well-
known #P-hard problem [9].2 However, there are many
practical algorithms that compute I"q(F ). For example,
computing I"q(F ) can be reduced to a special weighted
model counting problem [3, 21]. In this paper, we do not
focus on computing the (instantaneous) prices of securities;
we will focus on the price-updating phase, that is, charac-
terizing structure-preserving securities.
2.3 Bayesian Networks and Probabilistic Belief
Aggregation
A Bayesian network over V is a compact representation for
a probability distribution Pr over V . It is composed of two
parts: a direct acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V , E), and
conditional preference tables (CPTs), one for each vari-
able Xk ∈ V , which specifies the conditional probability
of Xk given any valuation of its parents in G. For any
G and any Xk ∈ V , let PaG(Xk) denote the set of par-
ents of Xk in G; let ChG(Xk) denote the set of children
of Xk in G; let DeG(Xk) denote the set of all descen-
dants of Xk in G. The subscript G is sometimes omit-
ted when causing no confusion. For any valuation !v of
V , Pr(!v) = ∏X∈V Pr(!v(X)|!v(Pa(X))), where for any
V ⊆ V , !v(V ) is the valuation over V that agrees with !v.
We say that Pr is compatible with G.
For any variableXk, let BlG(Xk) denote theMarkov blan-
ket of Xk. That is, BlG(Xk) = Pa(Xk) ∪ Ch(Xk) ∪⋃
X∈Ch(Xk)(Pa(X) \ {Xk}). A DAG G is decomposable,if for each variableXk ∈ V , there is an edge between each
pair of its parents in G. In other words,G is decomposable
if for each variable Xk, BlG(Xk) = Pa(Xk) ∪ Ch(Xk).
A probability distribution Pr is G-compatible, denoted by
Pr ∼ G, if it can be represented by a Bayesian network
whose DAG is G. Any G-compatible probability distri-
bution Pr satisfies all local Markov properties in G: any
variable Xk is conditionally independent of V \ ({Xk} ∪
BlG(Xk)) given any valuation of BlG(Xk).
Probabilistic belief aggregation has attracted a lot of inter-
ests in statistics [12, 13], and more recently in artificial
intelligence [15, 18, 20]. The basic problem is to study
how to aggregate the beliefs of multiple agents (represent-
2In the setting of [5], computing I!q(F ) amounts to computing
a marginal probability in a tree-structured Bayesian network (see
Example 1), which the well-known belief propagation algorith-
m [19] takes polynomial time to solve.
ed by probability distributions) to a single probability dis-
tribution. The function that takes individual distribution-
s as inputs and outputs a single combined distribution is
a called an opinion pool function. One of the most well-
known opinion pool function is logarithmic opinion pool
(LogOP), which is defined as follows (we only need to con-
sider two inputs in this paper).
Definition 1 Let Pr1 and Pr2 be two probability dis-
tributions over Ω. For any α1,α2 ∈ R, let Pr =
LogOP(α1Pr1,α2Pr2) denote the probability distribution
such that for any !v ∈ Ω, Pr(!v) ∝
(
Pr1(!v)
)α1 ·(Pr2(!v))α2 .
To better present our results, we define the following terms.
Definition 2 A DAG G admits a security F , if for any G-
compatible market price distribution Pr and any ∆ ∈ R,
after ∆b shares of F are sold, the new market price distri-
bution is also G-compatible. In this case, we also say that
F is structure preserving for G.
We remark that it is possible that for a particular G-
compatible market price distribution, after some shares of a
non-structure-preserving security F are sold, the new mar-
ket price distribution is still G-compatible.
2.4 A Combinatorial Prediction Market for
Tournaments
Chen et al. [5] used the following Bayesian network struc-
ture for pricing combinatorial prediction markets for tour-
naments of 2m teams.
Definition 3 The tournament of 2m (m ≥ 2) teams
{T1, . . . , T2m} is modeled by a binary tree composed of
2m − 1 variables as follows. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let Ri =
{X2m−i , . . . , X2m−i+1−1}. For any j ≤ 2m−1 − 1, X2j
andX2j+1 are the two children ofXj;Xj takes a value in
Ωj , which is defined recursively as follows: for any j such
that 2m−1 ≤ j ≤ 2m − 1, Ωj = {T2j+1−2m , T2j+2−2m};
for any j ≤ 2m−1 − 1, Ωj = Ω2j ∪ Ω2j+1. That is, the
domain of Xj is composed of all teams that can reachXj ,
and Ri is composed of all round i matches. The set of all
variables is Vm = R1 ∪ . . . ∪Rm.
Example 1Figure 1 illustrates a tournament of eight teams.
The domain of each variable is also shown.
X1
X2 X3
X4 X5 X6 X7 R1
R2
R3
{T1,T2} {T3,T4} {T5,T6} {T7,T8}
{T1,T2,T3,T4} {T5,T6,T7,T8}
{T1, . . . ,T8}
Figure 1: The Bayesian network structure for a tournament
of eight teams.
In this model, not all variables in Vm are binary, and an
outcome is a valuation of the variables in Vm. We note that
some outcomes never happen in real-life tournaments. For
example, if we already haveX1 = T1 (meaning that Team
1 is the winner of the whole tournament), then we cannot
have X2 = T2 (which implies that Team 1 loses to Team
2 in the first round). Chen et al. [5] avoided this problem
by focusing on the market price distributions that assign 0
probability to these inconsistent outcomes.
Chen et al. [5] proved the followingmain results: two types
of popular securities are structure preserving for the DAG
defined in Definition 3. The first type is composed of all
securities of the form “Team i wins game Xk” (Theorem
3.1 in Chen et al. [5]), which corresponds to the securi-
ty [Xk = Ti]; the second type is composed of all securi-
ties of the form “Team i1 and i2 win games Xk1 and Xk2 ,
respectively, where Xk1 is the parent of Xk2” (Theorem
3.2 in Chen et al. [5]), which corresponds to the security
(Xk1 = Ti1) ∧ (Xk2 = Ti2).
As we will see, our results significantly extend the results
by Chen et al. in two dimensions: first, we give a com-
plete characterization of all structure-preserving securities,
including the two types studied by Chen et al., and second,
our results work for any combinatorial prediction market,
including the one illustrated in this section.
3 A Natural Connection between LMSR
and LogOP
In this section, we reveal a very natural connection between
LMSR-based combinatorial prediction markets and proba-
bilistic belief aggregation by LogOP. At a hight level, these
two approaches (prediction markets and probabilistic belief
aggregation) are close. In probabilistic belief aggregation,
often, the agents’ beliefs are expressed explicitly as prob-
ability distributions, so that we can directly use an opinion
pool function to aggregate these distributions. On the other
hand, in prediction markets, agents implicitly express part
of their beliefs via their behavior in the markets (buying or
selling securities), and the market price reflects the aggre-
gated belief. Technically the connection is quite simple and
intuitive: we first interpret the agents’ behavior of buying
a security F as a probability distribution PrF ; then, we use
LogOP to merge PrF and the current market price distri-
bution Pr, and show that the new distribution is exactly the
updated market price distribution Pr after F is sold. PrF is
defined as follows.
Definition 4 For any logical formula F , let PrF denote
the probability distribution such that for any valuation !v,
PrF (!v) ∝ eF ("v).
The main theorem of this section is the following.
Theorem 1 Let ∆ ∈ R, and let Pr (respectively, Pr) de-
note the market price distribution before (respectively, af-
ter) an agent purchases ∆b shares of a security F . We
have Pr = LogOP(Pr,∆PrF ). Moreover, if both Pr and
PrF satisfy all local Markov properties in a DAG G, then
Pr also satisfies all local Markov properties in G.
Proof: Let !q denote the quantity vector correspond-
ing to Pr. Let !1F denote the 0-1 vector over Ω, where
for any valuation !v over V , the !v component of !1F is
F (!v). Let !t = !q + ∆b!1F . It follows that Pr = I"t. Let
Pr∗ = LogOP(Pr, PrF ). For any pair of valuations !u, !w, we
have I"t(!u)
I"t(!w)
=
I"q(!u)
I"q(!w)
·
e∆F ("u)
e∆F ("w)
=
Pr(!u)
Pr(!w) ·
( PrF (!u)
PrF (!w)
)∆
=
Pr∗(!u)
Pr∗(!w) . Therefore, Pr = Pr
∗.
If both Pr and PrF satisfy all local Markov properties in
G, then for any variable Xk, any i ≤ lk, any valua-
tion !v of BlG(Xk), and any pair of valuations !u, !w of
V \ ({Xk} ∪ BlG(Xk)), we have Pr(Xk = i,!v, !u)Pr(Xk = i,!v, !w) =
PrF (Xk = i,!v, !u)
PrF (Xk = i,!v, !w) = 1. Therefore,
Pr(Xk = i,!v, !u)
Pr(Xk = i,!v, !w)
=
Pr(Xk = i,!v, !u)
Pr(Xk = i,!v, !w) ·
( PrF (Xk = i,!v, !u)
PrF (Xk = i,!v, !w)
)∆
= 1, which
means that Pr also satisfies all local Markov properties in
G. !
We are not aware of any previous work pointing out this
simple and intuitive connection. The second part of The-
orem 1 states that LogOP preserves the satisfiability of lo-
cal Markov properties. This observation will be useful in
proving our characterization of the structure-preserving se-
curities. We note that in Theorem 1, when∆ < 0, an agent
purchasing∆b shares of F from the market maker is equiv-
alent to she selling −∆b shares of F to the market maker.
Definition 4 did not specify how PrF is represented (e.g.,
by a Bayesian network). We next provide a necessary and
sufficient condition on F for PrF to satisfy all local Markov
properties in a DAG G.
Definition 5 A logical formula F is compatible with a
DAG G, if for any variable Xk, any valuation !v of
BlG(Xk), any values i1, i2 ∈ Ωk, and any pair of valu-
ations !u, !w of V \ (BlG(Xk)∪{Xk}), the following condi-
tion holds: if F (Xk = i1,!v, !u) *= F (Xk = i2,!v, !u), then
F (Xk = i1,!v, !u) = F (Xk = i1,!v, !w).
Example 2 Let G be the DAG in Example 1. Let F =
(X2 = T1) ∧ (X5 = T3). F is compatible with G. Let
F ′ = (X2 = T1) ∧ (X5 = T3) ∧ (X3 = T8). F ′ is not
compatible with G, because F ′(X2 = T1, X5 = T3, X3 =
T8) = 1 *= 0 = F ′(X2 = T1, X5 = T4, X3 = T8) and
F ′(X2 = T1, X5 = T3, X3 = T8) = 1 *= 0 = F ′(X2 =
T1, X5 = T3, X3 = T5). This violates the condition in
Definition 5, where k = 5, i1 = T3, i2 = T4, !v = [X2 =
T1], !u is a valuation where X3 = T8, and !w is a valuation
where X3 = T5.
The condition in Definition 5 may seem unnatural at first,
but in fact it has a quite intuitive explanation: F is com-
patible with G if for every variable Xk, the capability of
changing the value of F by changing the value of Xk only
depends on the variables in the Markov blanket ofXk.
Proposition 1 Let G be a DAG. PrF satisfies all local
Markov properties in G if and only if F is compatible with
G.
Proof: Suppose PrF satisfies all local Markov prop-
erties. We recall that for any valuation !v, there are on-
ly two possible values of PrF (!v)—it is either e/α or
1/α, where α is a normalizing factor. Therefore, sup-
pose PrF (Xk = i1,!v, !u) *= PrF (Xk = i2,!v, !u), then we
must have PrF (Xk = i1,!v, !w) = PrF (Xk = i1,!v, !u) *=
PrF (Xk = i2,!v, !w) = PrF (Xk = i2,!v, !u). This corre-
sponds to the condition in Definition 5, which proves the
proposition. !
In general, satisfying all local Markov properties in G is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for a probability
distribution to be compatible with G. However, it is suf-
ficient when G is decomposable, because for any variable
Xk, BlG(Xk) = Pa(Xk) ∪ Ch(Xk). Therefore, we im-
mediately have the following corollaries of Theorem 1 and
Proposition 1 for decomposable DAGs.
Corollary 1 PrF is compatible with a decomposable DAG
G if and only if F is compatible with G.
Corollary 2 Let ∆ ∈ R. Let Pr (respectively, Pr) denote
the market price before (respectively, after) an agent pur-
chases ∆b shares of a security F . If both Pr and F are
compatible with a decomposable DAG G, then Pr is also
compatible with G.
We next show that the following securities are compatible
with G.
Proposition 2 Let G be a decomposable DAG. Any secu-
rity F that only uses the variables in a clique in G is com-
patible with G.
Proof: Let X denote the set of variables used in F . For
any Xk ∈ X , because X is a clique, X ⊆ BlG(Xk) =
Pa(Xk) ∪ Ch(Xk). Therefore, the value of any variable
in V \ ({Xk} ∪ BlG(Xk)) does not affect the value of F ,
which means that F is compatible with G. !
In general, checking whether F is compatible with a de-
composable DAG is coNP-complete.
Proposition 3 It is coNP-complete to check whether a
logical formula F is compatible with a decomposable DAG
G.
Proof: We prove that the coNP-hardness holds even
when all variables are binary and G has no edges. For any
k ≤ n, let Ωk = {1, 2}. Our proof is by a reduction from
the complement of the well-known NP-complete problem
SAT. In a SAT instance, we are given a logical formula H
in CNF, and we are asked whether there exists a valuation
under whichH = 1. Without loss of generality, letH be a
CNF over {X2, . . . , Xn} that is not a tautology. Let !uH de-
note an arbitrary valuation under whichH is false. !uH can
be easily found by assigning values to make an arbitrary
clause false. Let F = (X1 = 1) ∧H .
If H is satisfiable, then there exists a valuation !vH under
which H is true. Because F (X1 = 1,!vH) = 1 *= 0 =
F (X1 = 2,!vH) and F (X1 = 1,!vH) = 1 *= 0 = F (X1 =
1, !uH), F is not compatible with G.
On the other hand, if H is not satisfiable, then for any val-
uation !v over {X1, . . . , Xn}, H is false, which means that
F is always false. Therefore, F is compatible withG. This
proves the coNP-hardess of the problem.
The membership in coNP is straightforward: it is easy to
verify whether the condition in Definition 5 is violated, giv-
en k, i1, i2,!v, !u, and !w. Therefore, it is coNP-complete to
verify whether F is compatible with G. !
4 Characterizing Structure-preserving
Securities for Decomposable DAGs
In this section, we use the connection revealed in the
last section to obtain a full characterization of structure-
preserving securities for decomposable DAGs. This is the
main theorem of the paper. We note that Corollary 2 im-
plies that for F to be structure preserving for a decom-
posable DAG G, it suffices for F to be compatible with
G. However, it is not immediately clear how to efficient-
ly compute the new market price distribution. We say that
a variable Xk is pivotal in F , if there exists a valuation !v
of V \ {Xk} and i1, i2 ≤ lk such that F (Xk = i1,!v) *=
F (Xk = i2,!v).
Theorem 2 Let G be a decomposable DAG. F is struc-
ture preserving for G if and only if F is compatible with
G. Moreover, after any shares of F is purchased, the new
market price distribution can be computed in polynomial
time, where only the CPTs of the pivotal variables and the
ancestors of the pivotal variables in F are updated.
Proof: The “only if” part is obvious. Let Pru de-
note the uniform distribution, which is compatible with
G. Then, by Theorem 1, for any structure-preserving se-
curity F , the market price after b shares of F are sold is
LogOP(Pru, PrF ) = PrF , which is compatible with G. By
Proposition 1, F is compatible with G.
Next, we prove the “if” part by presenting a polynomial-
time price-updating algorithm. By Theorem 1, after ∆b
shares of F are purchased, the market price distribution
becomes LogOP(Pr,∆PrF ). It suffices if we can direct-
ly compute the outcome of LogOP. Fortunately, when the
graph is decomposable, we can use the polynomial-time al-
gorithm devised by Pennock andWellman (Section 3.4.1 in
Pennock andWellman [20]) to compute LogOP(Pr,∆PrF ).
W.l.o.g. for any k ≤ n, Pa(Xk) ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xk−1}.
The algorithm starts with the last variableXn, and updates
CPTs of the variables in the reverse order. Given any valu-
ation !v of Pa(Xn), for any i ≤ lk, the algorithm computes
Pr(Xn = i,!v)/Pr(Xn = 1,!v), which uniquely determines
the conditional probability Pr(Xn|!v). Then, the algorithm
moves on toXn−1, and computes the conditional probabil-
ities in a similar way, etc. We reproduce the algorithm in
Pennock and Wellman [20] for completeness of the paper
(Algorithm 1). For any variable Xk, we let [De(Xk) = !1]
denote the event where all descendants of Xk take 1; for
any Xj ∈ De(Xk), we let [De(Xk)−j = !1] denote the
event where all descendants ofXk, exceptXj , take 1.
Algorithm 1: CompPrice
Input: A graphG, a G-compatible probability distribution
Pr, a G-compatible logical formula F , and∆ ∈ R.
Output: The market price distribution Pr after∆b shares
of F are sold.
1 Compute the CPTs of PrF .
2 Pr(Xn|Pa(Xn)) ∝
Pr(Xn|Pa(Xn))
(PrF (Xn|Pa(Xn)))∆.
3 for k = n− 1 downto 1 do
4 Pr(Xk|De(Xk) = !1,Pa(Xk)) ∝ Pr(Xk|De(Xk) =
!1,Pa(Xk))
(PrF (Xk|De(Xk) = !1,Pa(Xk)))∆.
5 for i = 2 to lk do
6 Pr(Xk = 1|Pa(Xk))Pr(Xk = i|Pa(Xk))
=
Pr(Xk = 1|De(Xk) = !1,Pa(Xk))
Pr(Xk = i|De(Xk) = !1,Pa(Xk))
×
7
∏
Xj∈De(Xk)
Pr(Xj = 1|Xk = i,De(Xk)−j = !1,Pa(Xk))
Pr(Xj = 1|Xk = 1,De(Xk)−j = !1, Pa(Xk))
8 end
9 Compute Pr(Xk|Pa(Xk)).
10 end
It is not hard to see that in Algorithm 1, if a variable X is
neither an ancestor of any pivotal variable nor pivotal, then
the CPT ofX is not updated. !
Theorem 2 is two-fold. On the positive side, if we can show
that a security F is compatible with G, then F is very fa-
vorable for price-updating—the market price distribution
after any shares of F are traded is still G-compatible, as
long as the the market price distribution before the trade is
G-compatible. In particular, let G be the graph in Defini-
tion 3, if a security F is G-compatible, then we can ignore
the assumption made in Chen et al. [5] that the inconsistent
outcomes are assigned probability 0. Even though check-
ing whether F is compatible with G is coNP-hard (Propo-
sition 3), this compatibility check can be done offline.
On the negative side, requiring a security F to be G-
compatible is a strong condition—it requires that trading
any share of F does not change the network structure for
any G-compatible market price distribution. It is possible
that when the agents are only allowed to trade securities in
some specific set (which might contain securities that are
not compatible with G) from the very beginning, the mar-
ket price distribution is always compatible with G. Explor-
ing such set of securities is a hard and practical problem for
future research.
We recall that in a decomposable DAG G, any formula F
that only uses the variables in a clique inG isG-compatible
(Proposition 2). Therefore, we immediately obtain the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 3 Let G be a decomposable DAG. Any formula
F that only uses the variables in a clique in G is structure
preserving for G.
We note that the two main results in Chen et al. [5] are
corollaries of Corollary 3. We recall that the Bayesian net-
work used by Chen et al. is tree-structured (see Example 1),
which is decomposable. Therefore, by Corollary 3, any
security that only involves a single variable is structure p-
reserving. In particular, for any team i and any variable
Xk, the security [Xk = Ti] is structure preserving, which
is Theorem 3.1 in Chen et al. [5]. For any pair of vari-
ables Xk1 and Xk2 where Xk1 is the parent of Xk2 , by
Corollary 3, any security that only involves Xk1 and Xk2
is structure preserving. In particular, for any pair of team-
s Ti1 and Ti2 , the security (Xk1 = Ti1) ∧ (Xk2 = Ti2)
is structure preserving, which is Theorem 3.2 in Chen et
al. [5].
5 Network Structures That Admit a Basic
Set of Securities
In this section, we characterize the Bayesian network struc-
tures that admit a basic set of securities, which justifies our
focus on decomposable network structures in the last sec-
tion.
To prove our theorem, we will make use of the following
lemma proved by Chen et al. [5], where Pr (respectively, Pr)
is the market price distribution before (respectively, after)
∆b shares of the security is purchased.
Lemma 1 (Corollary 3.2 of [5]) Suppose ∆b shares are
purchased for event A, then for any events B and E,
Pr(B|E) = Pr(B|E)
[
e∆Pr(A|BE) + Pr(A¯|BE)
e∆Pr(A|E) + Pr(A¯|E)
]
Theorem 3 Let G be a DAG. If for every k ≤ n and every
i ≤ lk, the security [Xk = i] is structure preserving for G,
then G is decomposable.
Proof: For the sake of contradiction, suppose G is not
decomposable. Then, there exists k3 ≤ n and Xk1 , Xk2 ∈
Pa(Xk3) such that there is no edge between Xk1 and Xk2
in G. W.l.o.g. let k1 = 1, k2 = 2, k3 = 3, and X1 is not
a descendant of X2 in G. We define a G-compatible mar-
ket price distribution Pr∗ as follows. For any valuation !v
of Pa(X3) \ {X1, X2}, we let Pr∗(X3 = 1|X1 = 1, X2 =
1,!v) = 14 and Pr∗(X3 = 2|X1 = 1, X2 = 1,!v) = 34 . For
any k′ ≤ n, we let Pr∗(Xk′ = 1|Pa(Xk′ )) = Pr∗(Xk′ =
2|Pa(Xk′)) = 12 , if these conditional probabilities are not
defined previously. Let Pr∗ denote the market price distri-
bution after ∆b shares of [X3 = 1] are sold to an agent.
Because [X3 = 1] is structure preserving for G, Pr∗ is G-
compatible. In what follows, we use Lemma 1 to prove that
in Pr∗,X1 andX2 are not independent given any valuation
!v of X2, which contradicts the assumption that there is no
edge betweenX1 andX2 inG, andX1 is not a descendent
ofX2.
We note that essentially Pr∗ is compatible with a DAG
where there are only two edges: one from X1 to X3 and
the other from X2 to X3. Therefore, in Pr∗, PaG(X2) is
independent from X1, X2, and X3. For any valuation !v
of PaG(X2), we have the following calculations. For any
k = 1, 2, 3, we let E1k denote the valuationXk = 1.
• Pr∗(E13 |!v) = Pr∗(E13 ) = 716 .
• Pr∗(E13 |E11 ,!v) = Pr∗(E13 |E11) = 38 , Pr∗(E13 |E12 ,!v) =
Pr∗(E13 |E12) = 38 .
• Pr∗(E13 |E11 , E12 ,!v) = Pr∗(E13 |E11 , E12 ) = 14 .
We calculate Pr∗(E12 |!v) by Lemma 1 as follows (where
A = E13 , B = E12 , and E = !v).
Pr∗(E12 |!v)
=Pr∗(E12 |!v)
[
e∆Pr∗(E13 |E12 ,!v) + Pr∗(E13 |E12 ,!v)
e∆Pr∗(E13 |!v) + Pr∗(E13 |!v)
]
=Pr∗(E12 )
[
e∆6 + 10
e∆7 + 9
]
We then calculate Pr∗(E12 |E11 ,!v) by Lemma 1 as follows
(where A = E13 , B = E12 , and E = (E11 ,!v)). Because X1
is independent from X2 in Pr∗, we have Pr∗(E12 |E11 ,!v) =
Pr∗(E12 |E11) = Pr∗(E12 ).
Pr∗(E12 |E11 ,!v)
=Pr∗(E12 |E11 ,!v)
[
e∆Pr∗(E13 |E11 ,E12 ,"v)+Pr∗(E13 |E11 ,E12 ,"v)
e∆Pr∗(E13 |E11 ,"v)+Pr∗(E13 |E11 ,"v)
]
=Pr∗(E12)
[
e∆2 + 6
e∆3 + 5
]
For any ∆ *= 0, e
∆2 + 6
e∆3 + 5
*=
e∆6 + 10
e∆7 + 9
. Therefore, when
∆ *= 0, Pr∗(E12 |!v) *= Pr∗(E12 |E11 ,!v), which means that
given any valuation !v of the parents of X2 in G, X1 and
X2 are not independent. However, because Pr∗ is G-
compatible and X1 is not a descendant of X2, we must
have that X1 and X2 are independent given any valuation
of the parents of X2, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
G is decomposable. !
It follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 3 that for any
variable Xk and any value i ≤ lk, the security [Xk = i]
is structure preserving for any decomposable DAG over V ,
which leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 4 A DAG G is decomposable if and only if for
every k ≤ n and every i ≤ lk, the security [Xk = i] is
structure preserving for G.
6 Approximate Price Updating
For a security F , being compatible with a sparse decom-
posable DAG is a strong condition. Therefore, in practice
it is important to study how to approximately update the
market price distribution when a security F is not compat-
ible with G, while keeping the Bayesian network structure
G the same. Intuitively there are at least two ways to do
so. The first is to approximate F by a G-compatible log-
ical formula F ′ that is closest to F in terms of Hamming
distance. Then, after F is sold, we update the market price
distribution as if F ′ is sold. We do not pursue this approach
in this paper.
In this section, we propose an approximation in light of
the connection we revealed in Section 3. We recall that
F corresponds to a distribution PrF (Definition 4), and
subsequently price-updating in LMSR-based markets cor-
responds to aggregating Pr and PrF by LogOP. Therefore,
we seek for a probability distribution Pr∗F that is compatible
withG, and is as close to PrF as possible. A natural metric
that measures the closeness between two probability dis-
tributions is the KL divergence (also known as relative en-
tropy). For any pair of probability distributions Pr and Pr′,
KL(Pr, Pr′) = ∑"v Pr(!v) log(Pr′(!v)/Pr(!v)). We note that
KL divergence is not a distance, because it is not commuta-
tive, that is, usually KL(Pr, Pr′) *= KL(Pr′, Pr). Then, after
∆b shares of F is sold, we update the market price distribu-
tion by using Algorithm 1 to compute LogOP(Pr,∆Pr∗F ),
where Pr is the market price distribution before F is sold.
Given PrF , finding Pr∗F that minimizes its KL divergence
from PrF is a classical problem in Bayesian network learn-
ing, for which there is a conceptually simple and intuitive
solution, defined as follows.
Definition 6 For any logical formula F , let Pr∗F denote
the G-compatible distribution where for any variable Xk,
Pr∗F (Xk|PaG(Xk)) = PrF (Xk|PaG(Xk)).
That is, in Pr∗F , the CPT entry of Xk given any valuation !v
of the parents ofXk in G is exactly the same as the condi-
tional probability PrF (Xk|!v).
Theorem 5 (Theorem 17.2 in Darwiche [10])
Pr∗F = arg minPr∼GKL(PrF ,Pr)
When F is notG-compatible, PrF (Xk|PaG(Xk))might be
hard to compute. The following proposition simplifies the
computation, whose proof directly follows the definition of
PrF and Bayes’ rule, and therefore is omitted.
Proposition 4 For any variableXk, any set of variables Y
such that Xk *∈ Y , any valuation !y of Y , and any i ≤ lk,
we have:
PrF (Xk = i|!y) =
(e− 1)gF (Xk = i, !y) +
∏
Xl (∈(Y ∪{Xk})
|Ωl|
(e− 1)gF (!y) +
∏
Xl (∈Y
|Ωl|
Here for any set of variable Z and any valuation !z of Z ,
gF (!z) = |{!v : F (!v) = 1 and !v(Z) = !z}|, where !v(Z) is
the valuation over Z that agrees with !v.
Therefore, computing PrF (Xk = i|!y) amounts to comput-
ing gF (Xk = i, !y) and gF (!y). These are standard mod-
el counting problems, which are #P-complete. However,
there are many practical algorithms for computing their ex-
act values as well as approximations [14].
7 Future Work
A number of questions remain for future research. Can we
design efficient (randomized/approximation) algorithms to
compute the price of a security when the market price dis-
tribution is represented by a sparse decomposable Bayesian
network?3 How can we evaluate our approximation tech-
nique in real-life combinatorial prediction markets? Are
there any better approximation methods? Can we find a
natural set of (not necessarily structure-preserving) secu-
rities such that the market price distribution is always G-
compatible, if only the securities in this set are traded?
More generally, we believe that the connection between
prediction markets and probabilistic belief aggregationwill
shed some light on designing better combinatorial predic-
tion markets.
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